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Abstract
When one considers an optimal portfolio policy under a mean-risk
formulation, it is essential to correctly model investors’ risk aversion
which may be time variant, or even state-dependent. In this paper,
we propose a behavioral risk aversion model, in which risk aversion
is a piecewise linear function of the current wealth level with a ref-
erence point at the discounted investment target. Due to the time
inconsistency of the resulting multi-period mean-variance model with
adaptive risk aversion, we investigate the time consistent behavioral
portfolio policy by solving a nested mean-variance game formulation.
We derive a semi-analytical time consistent behavioral portfolio pol-
icy which takes a piecewise linear feedback form of the current wealth
level with respect to the discounted investment target. Finally, we
extend our results on time consistent behavioral portfolio selection to
dynamic mean-variance formulation with a cone constraint.
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1 Introduction
According to the classical investment doctrine in [Markowitz(1952)], an in-
vestor of a mean-variance type needs to strike a balance between maximizing
the expected value of the terminal wealth, E[X1|X0], and minimizing the in-
vestment risk measured by the variance of the terminal wealth, Var(X1|X0),
by solving the following mean-variance formulation,
(MV (γ)) : min Var(X1|X0)− γE[X1|X0],
where X0 is the initial wealth level, X1 is the terminal wealth at the end of
the (first) time period and γ ≥ 0 is the trade-off parameter between the two
conflicting objectives. We call γ the risk aversion parameter, which represents
the risk aversion attitude of the investor. The larger the value of γ, the less
the risk aversion of the investor. Mathematically, (MV (γ)) is equivalent to
the following formulation,
(MV (ω)) : max E[X1|X0]− ωVar(X1|X0),
with the risk aversion parameter ω = 1/γ.
In a dynamic investment environment, the risk aversion attitude of a
mean-variance investor may change from time to time, or could be even state-
dependent (i.e., dependent on the investor’s current wealth level Xt realized
at time t). [Bjo¨rk et al.(2014)] and [Wu(2013)] proposed, respectively, in
continuous-time and multi-period settings, that the risk aversion parameter
ω takes the following simple form of the current wealth level Xt,
ω(Xt) =
ω
Xt
, (ω ≥ 0).
Due to the positiveness of the wealth process Xt in the continuous-time
setting, ω(Xt) proposed by [Bjo¨rk et al.(2014)] is always nonnegative and is
a decreasing function of the current wealth level. Applying the same model to
a multi-period setting as proposed in [Wu(2013)], however, could encounter
some problem, as there is no guarantee for the positiveness of the wealth
process in a discrete-time setting. When the wealth level is negative, ω(Xt)
becomes negative, which leads to an irrationality of the investor to maximize
both the expected value and the variance of the terminal wealth, resulting
in an infinite position on the riskiest asset (See Theorem 7 in [Wu(2013)]).
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In a continuous time setting, [Hu et al.(2012)] introduced the risk aversion
parameter γ as a linear function of the current wealth level Xt,
γ(Xt) = µ1Xt + µ2, (µ1 ≥ 0).
When the wealth level is less than −µ2/µ1, γ(Xt) becomes negative. It
also leads to an irrationality of the investor, which contradicts the original
interests of the investor of a mean-variance type.
In this paper, we propose a behavioral risk aversion model as follows,
γt(Xt) =
{
γ+t (Xt − ρ
−1
t W ), if Xt ≥ ρ
−1
t W,
−γ−t (Xt − ρ
−1
t W ), if Xt < ρ
−1
t W,
(1)
where W is the investment target set by the investor at time 0, ρ−1t is the
risk-free discount factor from the current time t to the terminal time T , and
γ+t ≥ 0 and γ
−
t ≥ 0 are t-dependent risk aversion coefficients for the ranges
of Xt on the right and left sides of ρ
−1
t W , respectively. Basically, we consider
a piecewise linear state-dependent risk aversion function in our behavioral
risk aversion model.
This proposed behavioral risk aversion model is pretty flexible in incor-
porating the behavioral pattern of a mean-variance investor. If the current
wealth level is the same as the discounted investment target, the investor
becomes fully risk averse and thus invests only in the risk-free asset. If the
current wealth level is larger than the discounted investment target, the in-
vestor may consider the surplus over the discounted target level as house
money and the larger the surplus the less the risk aversion. If the current
wealth level is less than the discounted target level, the investor may intend
to break-even and the larger the shortage under the discounted target, the
stronger the desire to break-even (the less the risk aversion). The magnitude
of γ+t (or γ
−
t ) represents the risk aversion reduction with respect to one unit
increase of the surplus (or the shortage). Apparently, different mean-variance
investors may have different choices of γ+t and γ
−
t . For example, an investor,
who is eager for breaking-even when facing shortage and feels less sensitive
with the levels of surplus, may set γ−t > γ
+
t . Although we use the same terms
of “house money” and “break-even” as in behavioral finance, their meanings
are slightly different. In behavioral finance, the house money effect describes
the behavior that people take greater risk following prior gains, while the
break-even effect describes the behavior that people take greater risk follow-
ing prior losses (see, for examples, [Staw(1976)], [Thaler and Johnson(1990)],
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[Weber and Zuchel(2005)]). While no risk attitude is assumed for investors
in their study, all investors are assumed to be risk-averse under the dynamic
mean-variance framework discussed in this paper. Nevertheless, the key con-
cepts behind the house money and break-even effects are the same for both
our study and the literature in behavior finance: investors become less risk
averse when experiencing either larger gains or larger losses.
The main challenge of solving multi-period mean-variance portfolio se-
lection problem with the proposed behavioral risk aversion parameter is the
time inconsistency of the problem. To see this, let us consider the simple
problem with constant risk aversion parameter. At time 0, the investor faces
the following global mean-variance portfolio selection problem over the entire
investment time horizon,
(MV0(γ)) : min Var(XT |X0)− γE[XT |X0],
whose pre-committed optimal mean-variance policy is derived by [Li and Ng(2000)]
and given as follows,
u∗j = −E
−1[PjP
′
j]E[Pj]sj(Xj − λ0ρ
−1
j ), j = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
where Pj is the vector of excess return rates of risky assets, Xj is the wealth
level at time j and
λ0 = ρ0X0 +
γ
2
1∏T−1
k=0 (1− E[P
′
k]E
−1[PkP′k]E[Pk])
.
However, for t > 0, the investor may reconsider the mean-variance portfolio
selection problem for a truncated time horizon from t to T ,
(MVt(γ)) : min Var(XT |Xt)− γE[XT |Xt],
whose local optimal mean-variance policy is given by
u¯j = −E
−1[PjP
′
j]E[Pj ]sj(Xj − λtρ
−1
j ), j = t, t + 1, · · · , T − 1,
where
λt = Xtρt +
γ
2
1∏T−1
k=t (1− E[P
′
k]E
−1[PkP′k]E[Pk])
.
Since λ0 6= λt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1, this leads to u
∗
j 6= u¯j , j = t, t +
1, · · · , T−1, i.e., the local optimal policy is different from the pre-committed
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optimal policy. This interesting phenomenon is called time inconsistency (see
[Basak and Chabakauri(2010)], [Cui et al.(2012)], [Wang and Forsyth(2011)]).
In the language of dynamic programming, the Bellman’s principle of opti-
mality is not applicable to this model formulation, as the global and local ob-
jectives are not consistent (See [Artzner et al.(2007)], [Cui et al.(2012)]). In
the fields of dynamic risk measures and dynamic risk management, time con-
sistency is considered to be a basic requirement (see [Rosazza Gianin(2006)],
[Boda and Filar(2006)], [Artzner et al.(2007)] and [Jobert and Rogers(2008)]).
In fact, there exists a unique trade-off γ(Xt) which depends on the wealth
Xt, termed as the trade-off induced by the pre-committed optimal policy,
such that the optimal mean-variance policy of the truncated-time horizon
problem, (MVt(γ(Xt))), is the same as the pre-committed optimal policy,
i.e., the pre-committed optimal policy of (MV0(γ(X0))) could become a time
consistent policy of (MVt(γ(Xt))) when all the trade-offs are set as the
induced trade-offs (see [Cui et al.(2012)]). Furthermore, [Cui et al.(2012)]
showed that the trade-off induced by the pre-committed optimal policy is
a linear function in terms of the current wealth level Xt, the initial wealth
level X0 and the initial risk aversion parameter γ0(X0). Thus, the induced
trade-off may become negative over a finite time investment horizon, which
implies that investors may take irrational actions. This actually reveals that
a linear trade-off is a hidden reason behind time inconsistency. Thus, to bet-
ter the performance of the dynamic mean-variance formulation, the setting
of trade-off parameter should go beyond the class of linear functions.
[Strotz(1956)] suggested two possible actions to overcome time inconsis-
tency: (1) “He may try to pre commit his future activities either irrevocably
or by contriving a penalty for his future self if he should misbehave”, which
is termed as the strategy of precommitment; and (2) “He may resign himself
to the fact of inter temporal conflict and decide that his ‘optimal’ plan at
any date is a will-o’-the-wisp which cannot be attained, and learn to select
the present action which will be best in the light of future disobedience”,
which is termed the strategy of consistent planning. Strategy of consistent
planning is also called time consistent policy in the literature. For a dynamic
mean-variance model, [Basak and Chabakauri(2010)] reformulated it as an
interpersonal game model where the investor optimally chooses the policy at
any time t, on the premise that he has already decided his time consistent
policies in the future. More specifically, in a framework of time consistency,
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the investor faces the following nested portfolio selection problem,
(NMV0(γ)) : min
ut
Var(XT |Xt)− γE[XT |Xt],
s.t. uj solves (NMVj(γ)), t ≤ j ≤ T,
with the terminal period problem given as
(NMVT−1(γ)) : min
uT−1
Var(XT |XT−1)− γE[XT |XT−1].
The time consistent policy is then the equilibrium solution of the above nested
problem, which can be derived by a backward induction. [Bjo¨rk et al.(2014)],
[Hu et al.(2012)] and [Wu(2013)] extended the results in [Basak and Chabakauri(2010)]
by considering different state-dependent risk aversion mentioned before in
this section. For a general class of continuous-time mean-field linear-quadratic
control problems, please refer to [Yong(2013)]. In the original setting of dy-
namic mean-variance portfolio selection with constant risk aversion, the time
inconsistency is caused by the appearance of the variance of the terminal
wealth in the objective function, which does not satisfy the smoothing prop-
erty. Our model in this study that adopts a more realistic time-varying and
wealth dependent risk aversion further complicates the extent of time incon-
sistency, which forces us to consider time consistent policies in this paper.
In this paper, we focus on studying time consistent behavioral portfolio
policies under the proposed behavioral risk aversion model. The remaining
parts of this paper are organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide the
basic market setting and formulate the nested mean-variance portfolio se-
lection problem. We derive in Section 3 the semi-analytical time consistent
behavioral portfolio policy, which takes a piecewise linear feedback form of
the surplus or the shortage with respect to the discounted wealth target. In
Section 4, we extend our main results to cone constrained markets. After we
offer in Section 5 numerical analysis to show the trading patterns of investors
with different risk aversion coefficients, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Market Setting and Problem Formulation
We consider an arbitrage-free capital market of T -time periods, which con-
sists of one risk-free asset with deterministic rate of return and n risky assets
with random rates of return. An investor with an initial wealth X0 joins the
market at time 0 and allocates wealth among the risk-free asset and n risky
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assets at time 0 and the beginning of each of the following (T − 1) consecutive
periods. The deterministic rate of return of the risk-free asset at time period
t is denoted by st (> 1) and the random rates of return of the risky assets
at time period t are denoted by the vector et = [e
1
t , · · · , e
n
t ]
′, where eit is the
random rate of return of asset i at time period t and A′ denotes the transpose
operation of matrix or vector A. It is assumed that et, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
are statistically independent, absolutely integrable continuous random vec-
tors, whose finite first and second moments, E[et] and E[ete
′
t], are known for
every t and whose covariance matrixes Cov(et) = E[ete
′
t]− E[et]E[e
′
t], t = 0,
1, · · · , T − 1, are positive definite1. All of the random vectors are defined in
a filtered probability space (Ω,FT , {Ft}, P ), where Ft = σ(e0, e1, · · · , et−1)
and F0 is the trivial σ-algebra over Ω.
Let Xt be the wealth of the investor at the beginning of period t, and u
i
t,
i = 1, 2, · · · , n, be the amount invested in the i-th risky asset at period t.
Then, Xt −
∑n
i=1 u
i
t is the amount invested in the risk-free asset at period t.
Thus, the wealth at the beginning of period t+ 1 is given as
Xt+1 = st
(
Xt −
n∑
i=1
uit
)
+ e′tut = stXt +P
′
tut,
where
Pt = [P
1
t , P
2
t , · · · , P
n
t ]
′ = [(e1t − st), (e
2
t − st), · · · , (e
n
t − st)]
′
is the vector of the excess rates of return and ut = [u
1
t , u
2
t , · · · , u
n
t ]
′ is the
portfolio policy. We confine all admissible investment policies to be Ft-
measurable Markov control, whose realizations are in Rn. Then, Pt and ut
are independent, the controlled wealth process {Xt} is an adapted Markovian
process and Ft = σ(Xt).
An investor of mean-variance type considers the following portfolio deci-
sion problem at the beginning of period t,
(MVt(γt(Xt))) min Vart(XT )− γt(Xt)Et[XT ],
s.t. Xj+1 = sjXj +P
′
juj, j = t, t+ 1, · · · , T − 1,
(2)
1Our main results can be readily extended to situations where random vectors et, t =
0, 1, · · · , T − 1, are correlated. This extension can be achieved based on the concept of
the so-called opportunity-neutral measure introduced by [Cˇerny´ and Kallsen(2009)].
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where Vart(XT ) = Var(XT |Xt), Et[XT ] = E[XT |Xt], ρ
−1
t =
∏T−1
j=t s
−1
j is the
risk-free discount factor with ρ−1T = 1 and γt(Xt) is given by
γt(Xt) =
{
γ+t (Xt − ρ
−1
t W ), if Xt ≥ ρ
−1
t W,
−γ−t (Xt − ρ
−1
t W ), if Xt < ρ
−1
t W.
Due to the time inconsistency of (MVt(γt(Xt))), we aim to derive the
time consistent behavioral portfolio policy. More specifically, similar to the
approach in [Basak and Chabakauri(2010)], we formulate the multi-period
mean-variance model into an interpersonal game model in which the investor
optimally chooses the policy at any time t, on the premise that he has already
decided his time consistent policy in the future. Then the time consistent
behavioral portfolio policy (or time consistent policy in short) is the optimizer
of the following nested mean-variance problem (NMV ),
(NMVt(γt(Xt))) min
ut
Vart(XT )− γt(Xt)Et[XT ],
s.t. Xt+1 = stXt +P
′
tut, (3)
Xj+1 = sjXj +P
′
ju
TC
j , j = t+ 1, · · · , T − 1,
uTCj solves (MVj(γj(Xj))), j = t + 1, · · · , T − 1,
with terminal period problem given as
(NMVT−1(γT−1(XT−1))) min
uT−1
VarT−1(XT )− γT−1(XT−1)ET−1[XT ],
s.t. Xt = sT−1XT−1 +P
′
T−1uT−1, (4)
which can be solved by a backward induction. Since the stage-trade off γt(Xt)
reflects certain behavioral pattern of an investor in terms of his wealth level,
we call the optimal policy to (NMV ) time consistent behavioral portfolio
policy.
3 Semi-analytical Time Consistent Policy
In this section, we derive the semi-analytical time consistent behavioral
portfolio policy. Before presenting our main results, we define the follow-
ing two deterministic continuous functions, F−t (K) and F
+
t (K), on R
n for
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t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
F+t (K) =ρ
2
t+1K
′(Et[PtP
′
t]− Et[P
′
t]Et[Pt])K
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
+
t+1 + b
+
t+1)(st +P
′
tK)
21{st+P′tK≥0}
]
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
−
t+1 + b
−
t+1)(st +P
′
tK)
21{st+P′tK<0}
]
−
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK<0}
])2
− 2ρt+1Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≥0}
]
(st + Et[P
′
t]K)
− 2ρt+1Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK<0}
]
(st + Et[P
′
t]K)
− γ+t
(
Et[a
+
t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≥0}] + Et[a
−
t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK<0}]
)
− ρt+1γ
+
t (st + Et[P
′
t]K),
F−t (K) =ρ
2
t+1K
′(Et[PtP
′
t]− Et[P
′
t]Et[Pt])K
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
+
t+1 + b
+
t+1)(st +P
′
tK)
21{st+P′tK≤0}
]
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
−
t+1 + b
−
t+1)(st +P
′
tK)
21{st+P′tK>0}
]
−
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≤0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK>0}
])2
− 2ρt+1Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≤0}
]
(st + Et[P
′
t]K)
− 2ρt+1Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK>0}
]
(st + Et[P
′
t]K)
+ γ−t
(
Et[a
+
t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≤0}] + Et[a
−
t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK>0}]
)
+ ρt+1γ
−
t (st + Et[P
′
t]K),
with a+t+1, a
−
t+1, b
+
t+1 and b
−
t+1 being deterministic parameters.
The following proposition ensures that the optimizers of min
K∈Rn
F+t (K) and
min
K∈Rn
F−t (K) are finite.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that deterministic numbers a+t+1, a
−
t+1, b
+
t+1 and
b−t+1 satisfy
b+t+1 − (a
+
t+1)
2 ≥ 0, b−t+1 − (a
−
t+1)
2 ≥ 0.
Then we have
lim
‖K‖→+∞
F+t (K) = +∞, lim
‖K‖→+∞
F−t (K) = +∞,
where ‖K‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of vector K.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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According to Proposition 3.1, we denote the finite optimizers of min
K∈Rn
F+t (K)
and min
K∈Rn
F−t (K) as follows,
K+t = argmin
K∈Rn
F+t (K), K
−
t = argmin
K∈Rn
F−t (K),
and define the deterministic parameters a+t , a
−
t , b
+
t and b
−
t , t = 0, 1, · · · , T−1,
by the following backward recursions, respectively,
a+t = ρt+1Et[Pt]K
+
t + Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )1{st+P′tK
+
t ≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )1{st+P′tK+t <0}
]
, (5)
a−t = ρt+1Et[Pt]K
−
t + Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )1{st+P′tK
−
t ≤0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )1{st+P′tK−t >0}
]
, (6)
b+t = ρ
2
t+1(K
+
t )
′
Et[PtP
′
t]K
+
t + 2ρt+1Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )P
′
tK
+
t 1{st+P′tK
+
t ≥0}
]
+ 2ρt+1Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )P
′
tK
+
t 1{st+P′tK+t <0}
]
+ Et
[
b+t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )
21{st+P′tK
+
t ≥0}
]
+ Et
[
b−t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )
21{st+P′tK
+
t <0}
]
,
(7)
b−t = ρ
2
t+1(K
−
t )
′
Et[PtP
′
t]K
−
t + 2ρt+1Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )P
′
tK
−
t 1{st+P′tK−t ≤0}
]
+ 2ρt+1Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )P
′
tK
−
t 1{st+P′tK
−
t >0}
]
+ Et
[
b+t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )
21{st+P′tK−t ≤0}
]
+ Et
[
b−t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )
21{st+P′tK−t >0}
]
,
(8)
with terminal condition a+t = a
−
T = 0 and b
+
t = b
−
T = 0.
Remark 3.1. In general, functions F+t (K) and F
−
t (K) are not convex func-
tions with respect to K. However, when a+t+1 ≥ 0 ≥ a
−
t+1, it is easy to show
that F+t (K) and F
−
t (K) are d.c. functions (difference of convex functions)
with respect to K (see [Horst and Thoai(1999)]). In such cases, we can use
the existing global search methods for d.c. functions in the literature to derive
the optimizers, K+t and K
−
t .
With the above notations, we show now that the time consistent behav-
ioral portfolio policy is a piecewise linear feedback form of the surplus or the
shortage of current wealth level in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.1. The time consistent behavioral portfolio policy of (NMVt(γt(Xt)))
is given as follows for t = 0, . . ., T − 1,
uTCt = K
+
t (Xt − ρ
−1
t W )1{Xt≥ρ−1t W} +K
−
t (Xt − ρ
−1
t W )1{Xt<ρ−1t W}, (9)
in which the parameters a+t , a
−
t , b
+
t and b
−
t defined in (5)-(8) satisfy
b+t − (a
+
t )
2 ≥ 0, b−t − (a
−
t )
2 ≥ 0.
Furthermore, the mean and the variance of the terminal wealth achieved by
the time consistent behavioral portfolio policy are
E0[XT ]|uTC =ρ0X0 + a
+
0 (X0 − ρ
−1
0 W )1{X0≥ρ−10 W} + a
−
0 (X0 − ρ
−1
0 W )1{X0<ρ−10 W},
(10)
Var0(XT )|uTC =
[
(b+t − (a
+
t )
2)1{X0≥ρ−10 W} + (b
−
t − (a
−
t )
2)1{X0<ρ−10 W}
]
(X0 − ρ
−1
0 W )
2.
(11)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Remark 3.2. Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.1 have revealed that the nested
mean-variance problem (NMVt(γt(Xt))) is a well-posed problem in the sense
of the existence of a finite subgame Nash equilibrium policy.
Remark 3.3. In our behavioral risk aversion model, the functions F+t (K)
and F−t (K) are no longer convex functions with respect to K. However,
the optimal investment funds K+t and K
−
t can be derived off-line via some
global search methods, thus reducing the dynamic optimization problem into
T static optimization problems.
Remark 3.4. In the proofs of Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.1, the assump-
tion of γ+t ≥ 0 and γ
−
t ≥ 0 is not used. Therefore, our main results remain
valid for more general case with γ+t ∈ R and γ
−
t ∈ R.
4 Extension to Cone Constrained Markets
In real financial markets, realizations of (Ft-measurable) admissible policy
are often confined in a subset of Rn, instead of the whole space Rn. In this
section, we consider the situation that the realizations of admissible poli-
cies are required to be in a cone. Such cone-type constraints have been
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widely adopted to model regulatory restrictions, for example, restrictions for
no-short selling (see [Cui et al.(2014)] and [Li et al.(2001)]) or non-tradeable
assets. Cone-type constraints are also useful to represent portfolio restric-
tions, for example, the holding of the real estate stock must be no less than
the bank stock. We express the feasible set of the realizations of admissible
polices as At = {ut ∈ R
n|Aut ≥ 0, A ∈ R
m×n} (see [Cuoco(1997)] and
[Napp(2003)] for more examples). Now, mean-variance investors would face
the following cone-constrained nested mean-variance problem,
(CNMVt(γt(Xt))) min
ut
Vart(XT )− γt(Xt)Et[XT ],
s.t. Xt+1 = stXt +P
′
tut, (12)
Xj+1 = sjXj +P
′
ju
TC
j , j = t+ 1, · · · , T − 1,
ut ∈ At,
uTCj solves (MVj(γj(Xj))), j = t + 1, · · · , T − 1,
with the problem in the last stage given as
(CNMVT−1(γT−1(XT−1))) min
uT−1
VarT−1(XT )− γT−1(XT−1)ET−1[XT ],
s.t. Xt = sT−1XT−1 +P
′
T−1uT−1, (13)
uT−1 ∈ AT .
Theorem 4.1. The time consistent behavioral portfolio policy of (CNMVt(γt(Xt)))
is given as follows for t = 0, . . ., T − 1,
uTCt = K˜
+
t (Xt − ρ
−1
t W )1{Xt≥ρ−1t W} + K˜
−
t (Xt − ρ
−1
t W )1{Xt<ρ−1t W}. (14)
The optimal investment funds K˜+t and K˜
−
t are given by,
K˜+t = argmin
K∈At
F+t (K), K˜
−
t = argmin
K∈−At
F−t (K),
where −At = {−ut|ut ∈ At} is the negative cone of At, and the deterministic
parameters in F−t (K) and F
+
t (K), i.e., a
+
t , a
−
t , b
+
t and b
−
t , are computed
according to recursive functions (5)-(8) with K+ and K−t replaced by K˜
+
t
and K˜−t , respectively.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
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In cone constrained markets, the time consistent behavioral portfolio pol-
icy remains a piecewise linear feedback form of the current wealth level with
respect to the discounted investment target. The only difference from un-
constrained markets is that we need to search the optimal investment funds
in an At related cone instead of the entire space.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we study a numerical example to analyze the property of the
time consistent behavioral portfolio policy proposed in this paper.
We assume that the annual rates of return of the three risky indices
follow a joint lognormal distribution. An investor with initial wealth X0 = 1
is considering an investment opportunity of three years (T = 3), with his
behavioral risk aversion γt(Xt) expressed as follows,
γt(Xt) =
{
γ+(Xt − ρ
−1
t W ), if Xt ≥ ρ
−1
t W,
−γ−(Xt − ρ
−1
t W ), if Xt < ρ
−1
t W.
Consider a pension fund consisting of S&P 500 (SP), the index of Emerg-
ing Market (EM), Small Stock (MS) of the U.S market and a bank account
with annual rate of return equal to 5% (st = 1.05). Based on the data
provided in [Elton et al.(2007)], we list the expected values, variances and
correlation coefficients of the annual rates of return of these three indices in
Table 1.
Table 1: Data for the asset allocation example
SP EM MS
Expected Return 14% 16% 17%
Standard Deviation 18.5% 30% 24%
Correlation coefficient
SP 1 0.64 0.79
EM 1 0.75
MS 1
By simulating 20,000 sample paths for annual rates of return of the three
risky indices and adopting a global search method, we can compute the
optimal investment funds K+t , K
−
t and the deterministic parameters a
+
t , a
−
t ,
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b+t and b
−
t backwards. We provide the results for situations of γ
+ = 1 in
Table 2. Please note that F+t (K) and F
−
t (K) are now d.c. functions with
respect to K based on Remark 3.1.
Table 2: Optimal investment funds and parameters (γ− ≥ γ+)
γ+ γ− K+
2
K
−
2
a+
2
a−
2
b+
2
b−
2
1 0.5 [0.6347,-0.0764,0.7221]’ [-0.3174,0.0382,-0.3610]’ 0.1349 -0.0675 0.0857 0.0214
1 1 [0.6347,-0.0764,0.7221]’ [-0.6347,0.0764,-0.7220]’ 0.1349 -0.1349 0.0857 0.0857
1 1.5 [0.6347,-0.0764,0.7221]’ [-0.9520,0.1146,-1.0831]’ 0.1349 -0.2024 0.0857 0.1927
1 2 [0.6347,-0.0764,0.7221]’ [-1.2694,0.1528,-1.4441]’ 0.1349 -0.2698 0.0857 0.3427
1 2.5 [0.6347,-0.0764,0.7221]’ [-1.5867,0.1910,-1.8051]’ 0.1349 -0.3373 0.0857 0.5354
γ+ γ− K+
1
K
−
1
a+
1
a−
1
b+
1
b−
1
1 0.5 [0.4292,-0.0503,0.4775]’ [-0.3274,0.0384,-0.3641]’ 0.2492 -0.1388 0.1944 0.0528
1 1 [0.4292,-0.0503,0.4775]’ [-0.6968,0.0814,-0.7687]’ 0.2492 -0.2759 0.1944 0.2030
1 1.5 [0.4292,-0.0503,0.4775]’ [-1.0429,0.1188,-1.1317]’ 0.2492 -0.3996 0.1944 0.4223
1 2 [0.4292,-0.0503,0.4775]’ [-1.3655,0.1550,-1.4718]’ 0.2492 -0.5166 0.1944 0.7102
1 2.5 [0.4292,-0.0503,0.4775]’ [-1.6767,0.1918,-1.8098]’ 0.2492 -0.6329 0.1944 1.0802
γ+ γ− K+
0
K
−
0
a+
0
a−
0
b+
0
b−
0
1 0.5 [0.3309,-0.0492,0.3432]’ [-0.3505,0.0521,-0.3635]’ 0.3505 -0.2129 0.3189 0.0948
1 1 [0.3309,-0.0492,0.3432]’ [-0.7788,0.1159,-0.7974]’ 0.3505 -0.4171 0.3189 0.3477
1 1.5 [0.3309,-0.0492,0.3432]’ [-1.1312,0.1669,-1.1423]’ 0.3505 -0.5810 0.3189 0.6674
1 2 [0.3309,-0.0492,0.3432]’ [-1.4274,0.2116,-1.4624]’ 0.3505 -0.7289 0.3189 1.0643
1 2.5 [0.3309,-0.0492,0.3432]’ [-1.7402,0.2516,-1.7733]’ 0.3505 -0.8783 0.3189 1.5860
We can find some interesting features from Table 2. First, for given γ+,
the larger the value of γ−, the larger the absolute values of K−t , a
−
t and b
−
t .
Second, whenever the discounted investment target is less than the current
wealth level (i.e., ρ−1t W < Xt), the investor chooses to invest a portfolio,
which has almost a fixed proportionK+t with respect to the surplus of current
wealth level. Third, when the discounted investment target is larger than the
current wealth level (i.e., ρ−1t W > Xt), the investor with larger risk aversion
coefficient γ− invests a larger portfolio, which has larger proportion K−t with
respect to the shortage of the current wealth level. The third feature is quite
intuitive. When Xt > ρ
−1
t W , the larger the value of γ
−, the less risk aversion
of the investor at time t, which may result in larger risky positions.
For the situations of γ− = 1, F+t (K) and F
−
t (K) are also d.c. functions
with respect to K, and the first and third patterns remain the same as the
situation with γ+ = 1 (See Table 3). Additionally, for given γ−, the larger
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the value of γ+, the less the absolute values of K−t , a
−
t and b
−
t . In fact,
the same pattern holds for γ+ = 1. But the differences are too small to be
identified in Table 2.
Table 3: Optimal investment portfolios and parameters (γ+ ≥ γ−)
γ+ γ− K+
2
K
−
2
a+
2
a−
2
b+
2
b−
2
0.5 1 [0.3173,-0.0382,0.3610]’ [-0.6347,0.0764,-0.7220]’ 0.0675 -0.1349 0.0214 0.0857
1 1 [0.6347,-0.0764,0.7221]’ [-0.6347,0.0764,-0.7220]’ 0.1349 -0.1349 0.0857 0.0857
1.5 1 [0.9520,-0.1146,1.0831]’ [-0.6347,0.0764,-0.7220]’ 0.2024 -0.1349 0.1927 0.0857
2 1 [1.2694,-0.1528,1.4441]’ [-0.6347,0.0764,-0.7220]’ 0.2698 -0.1349 0.3427 0.0857
2.5 1 [1.5867,-0.1910,1.8051]’ [-0.6347,0.0764,-0.7220]’ 0.3373 -0.1349 0.5354 0.0857
γ+ γ− K+
1
K
−
1
a+
1
a−
1
b+
1
b−
1
0.5 1 [0.2526,-0.0296,0.2810]’ [-0.6985,0.0816,-0.7722]’ 0.1305 -0.2764 0.0508 0.2036
1 1 [0.4292,-0.0503,0.4775]’ [-0.6968,0.0814,-0.7687]’ 0.2492 -0.2759 0.1944 0.2030
1.5 1 [0.5427,-0.0636,0.6037]’ [-0.6951,0.0811,-0.7653]’ 0.3562 -0.2755 0.4159 0.2024
2 1 [0.6092,-0.0714,0.6777]’ [-0.6930,0.0809,-0.7615]’ 0.4533 -0.2749 0.7029 0.2017
2.5 1 [0.6431,-0.0754,0.7153]’ [-0.6906,0.0806,-0.7578]’ 0.5427 -0.2744 1.0467 0.2009
γ+ γ− K+
0
K
−
0
a+
0
a−
0
b+
0
b−
0
0.5 1 [0.2149,-0.0319,0.2228]’ [-0.7838,0.1166,-0.8057]’ 0.1897 -0.4186 0.0868 0.3499
1 1 [0.3309,-0.0492,0.3432]’ [-0.7788,0.1159,-0.7974]’ 0.3505 -0.4171 0.3189 0.3477
1.5 1 [0.3888,-0.0578,0.4032]’ [-0.7736,0.1155,-0.7893]’ 0.4866 -0.4156 0.6575 0.3454
2 1 [0.4145,-0.0616,0.4299]’ [-0.7683,0.1148,-0.7815]’ 0.6041 -0.4140 1.0761 0.3431
2.5 1 [0.4226,-0.0628,0.4382]’ [-0.7638,0.1143,-0.7739]’ 0.7080 -0.4125 1.5587 0.3408
Next, we analyze the global investment performance of the time consis-
tent behavioral portfolio policy proposed in this paper. We assume that all
investors choose a very natural investment target W = 2, which is twice
of the value of X0 and gives rise to ρ
−1
0 W > X0, i.e., the discounted in-
vestment target is no less than the initial wealth level. Figures 1(a) and
1(b) show the relationship of Sharpe ratio with respect to γ−(with γ+ = 1)
and γ+(with γ− = 1), respectively. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the proba-
bility density functions (PDFs) of terminal wealth levels with different risk
aversion coefficients. We can see that different investors may achieve dif-
ferent global investment performances under their different time consistent
behavioral portfolio policies. However, for the situations of γ− = 1, all the
investors’ time consistent policies are quite similar (see column K−t in Table
3), which results in similar Sharpe ratios and PDFs of the terminal wealth
levels. In other words, under our setting, the negative risk aversion coefficient
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γ− has a higher impact on the model. The reason can be explained by the
following numerical results. For the case of γ+ = 2.5 and γ− = 1, it is easy
to compute that
Pr(ρ−11 W > X1) = Pr(s0 +P
′
0K
−
0 > 0) = 0.9956,
P r(ρ−12 W > X2|ρ
−1
1 W > X1) = Pr(s1 +P
′
1K
−
1 > 0) = 0.9965,
P r(ρ−13 W > X3|ρ
−1
2 W > X2, ) = Pr(s2 +P
′
2K
−
2 > 0) = 0.9977,
due to ρ−10 W > X0. We can see that the investor has very large probability
staying in the domains of ρ−1t W > Xt, where γ
− is in effect.
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Figure 1: Relationship between Sharpe ratio and parameter settings
At last, we analyze our data in a cone constrained market. We present our
brief results under a no shorting constraint in Table 4. Due to the presence
of the no-shorting constraint, the position on risky indices is forced to zero
whenever the discounted investment target is larger than the current wealth
level, i.e., K−t = 0.
6 Conclusions
When we implement a portfolio selection methodology under a mean-risk
formulation, it is crucial to assess the investor’s subjective trade-off between
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Figure 2: PDFs of terminal wealth level
maximizing the expected terminal wealth and minimizing the investment
risk, which in turn requires good understanding of the investor’s risk aversion
which is in general an adaptive process of the wealth level. We propose in
this paper a behavioral risk aversion model to describe the risk attitude of a
mean-variance investor, which takes the piecewise linear form of the surplus
or the shortage with respect to some preset investment target. Our new
risk aversion model is flexible enough to incorporate the features of “house
money” and “breaking-even”, thus enriching the modeling power to capture
the essence of the investor’s risk attitude.
As the resulting dynamic mean-variance model with adaptive risk aversion
is time inconsistent, we focus on its time consistent policy by solving a nested
mean-variance game formulation. Fortunately, we obtain the semi-analytical
time consistent behavioral portfolio policy and reveal its piecewise linear
form of the surplus and the shortage with respect to the discounted wealth
target. Our numerical analysis sheds light on some prominent features of
the time consistent behavioral portfolio policy established in our theoretical
derivations.
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Table 4: Optimal investment portfolios and parameters (γ+ ≥ γ−)
γ+ γ− K+
2
K
−
2
a+
2
a−
2
b+
2
b−
2
1 0.5 [0.6204,0,0.6594]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.1346 0 0.0855 0
1 1 [0.6204,0,0.6594]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.1346 0 0.0855 0
1 1.5 [0.6204,0,0.6594]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.1346 0 0.0855 0
1 2 [0.6204,0,0.6594]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.1346 0 0.0855 0
0.5 1 [0.3091,0,0.3324]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.0675 0 0.0215 0
1 1 [0.6204,0,0.6594]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.1346 0 0.0855 0
1.5 1 [0.9308,0,0.9897]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.2020 0 0.1924 0
2 1 [1.2430,0,1.3160]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.2690 0 0.3415 0
γ+ γ− K+
1
K
−
1
a+
1
a−
1
b+
1
b−
1
1 0.5 [0.4189,0,0.4364]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.2484 0 0.1936 0
1 1 [0.4189,0,0.4364]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.2484 0 0.1936 0
1 1.5 [0.4189,0,0.4364]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.2484 0 0.1936 0
1 2 [0.4189,0,0.4364]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.2484 0 0.1936 0
0.5 1 [0.2450,0,0.2565]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.1302 0 0.0507 0
1 1 [0.4189,0,0.4364]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.2484 0 0.1936 0
1.5 1 [0.5284,0,0.5516]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.3550 0 0.4143 0
2 1 [0.5970,0,0.6193 ]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.4521 0 0.7006 0
γ+ γ− K+
0
K
−
0
a+
0
a−
0
b+
0
b−
0
1 0.5 [0.3171,0,0.3047]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.3491 0 0.3170 0
1 1 [0.3171,0,0.3047]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.3491 0 0.3170 0
1 1.5 [0.3171,0,0.3047]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.3491 0 0.3170 0
1 2 [0.3171,0,0.3047]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.3491 0 0.3170 0
0.5 1 [0.2071,0,0.1973]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.1890 0 0.0864 0
1 1 [0.3171,0,0.3047]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.3491 0 0.3170 0
1.5 1 [0.3747,0,0.3590]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.4851 0 0.6547 0
2 1 [0.3999,0,0.3825]’ [0,0,0]’ 0.6023 0 1.0720 0
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Appendix
Appendix A: The Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Define ξ = ‖K‖, L = Kξ−1 (which implies ‖L‖ = 1) and yt = P
′
tL.
Then, for any L, we have M ≥ Vart(yt) = L
′Cov(Pt)L > 0, where M is the
largest eigenvalue of Cov(Pt).
If yt1{yt≥0} is zero, (i.e., yt ≤ 0 almost surely), we can construct an
arbitrage portfolio by shorting L and holding L′1 risk-free asset. Similarly,
if yt1{yt<0} is zero, (i.e., yt ≥ 0 almost surely), we also can construct an
arbitrage portfolio by holding L and shorting L′1 risk-free asset. Thus, we
conclude that yt1{yt≥0} and yt1{yt<0} are nontrivial random variables with
finite second moment.
Moreover, Pt is absolutely integrable, so do yt, yt1{yt≥−stξ }
and yt1{yt<−stξ }
.
Then, for given L, we have
F+t (K) = F˜
+
t (ξ),
where
F˜+t (ξ) = ρ
2
t+1Vart(yt)ξ
2 + Et
[
(2ρt+1a
+
t+1 + b
+
t+1)(st + ξyt)
21{yt≥−stξ }
]
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
−
t+1 + b
−
t+1)(st + ξyt)
21{yt<−stξ }
]
−
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st + ξyt)1{yt≥−stξ }
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st + ξyt)1{yt<−stξ }
])2
− 2ρt+1
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st + ξyt)1{yt≥−stξ }
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st + ξyt)1{yt<−stξ }
])
(st + Et[yt]ξ)
− γ+t
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st + ξyt)1{yt≥−stξ }
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st + ξyt)1{yt<−stξ }
])
− ρt+1γ
+
t (st + Et[yt]ξ).
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Furthermore, we have
F˜+t (ξ) ≥ ρ
2
t+1Vart(yt)ξ
2 + (a+t+1)
2
Et
[
y2t 1{yt≥−stξ }
]
ξ2 + (a−t+1)
2
Et
[
y2t 1{yt<−stξ }
]
ξ2
−
(
a+t+1Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
]
ξ + a−t+1Et
[
yt1{yt<−stξ }
]
ξ
)2
+ 2ρt+1
(
a+t+1Et
[
y2t 1{yt≥−stξ }
]
ξ2 + a−t+1Et
[
y2t 1{yt<−stξ }
]
ξ2
)
− 2ρt+1
(
a+t+1Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
]
+ a−t+1Et
[
yt1{yt<−stξ }
])
Et[yt]ξ
2 +O(ξ)
= ρ2t+1Vart
(
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
)
ξ2 + ρ2t+1Vart
(
yt1{yt<−stξ }
)
ξ2
+ 2ρ2t+1
(
Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
yt1{yt<−stξ }
]
− Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
]
Et
[
yt1{yt<−stξ }
])
ξ2
+ (a+t+1)
2Vart
(
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
)
ξ2 + (a−t+1)
2Vart
(
yt1{yt<−stξ }
)
ξ2
+ 2a+t+1a
−
t+1
(
Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
yt1{yt<−stξ }
]
− Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
]
Et
[
yt1{yt<−stξ }
])
ξ2
+ 2ρt+1
(
a+t+1Vart
(
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
)
ξ2 + a−t+1Vart
(
yt1{yt<−stξ }
)
ξ2
)
+ 2ρt+1a
+
t+1
(
Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
yt1{yt<−stξ }
]
− Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
]
Et
[
yt1{yt<−stξ }
])
ξ2
+ 2ρt+1a
−
t+1
(
Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
yt1{yt<−stξ }
]
− Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
]
Et
[
yt1{yt<−stξ }
])
ξ2
+O(ξ)
=
[
ρt+1 + a
+
t+1, ρt+1 + a
−
t+1
]
Covt
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
yt1{yt<−stξ }
] [
ρt+1 + a
+
t+1
ρt+1 + a
−
t+1
]
ξ2 +O(ξ),
where O(ξ) is the infinity of the same order as ξ and the second equality
holds due to the fact of Et
[
yt1{yt≥−stξ }
yt1{yt<−stξ }
]
= 0. Hence,
lim
ξ→+∞
F˜+t (ξ) = lim
ξ→+∞
[
ρt+1 + a
+
t+1, ρt+1 + a
−
t+1
]
Covt
[
yt1{yt≥0}
yt1{yt<0}
] [
ρt+1 + a
+
t+1
ρt+1 + a
−
t+1
]
ξ2
+O(ξ) = +∞.
Based on the discussion for all possible L, we make our conclusion for F+t (K).
Similarly we can prove the result of F−t (K). 
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Appendix B: The Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. Let Yt = Xt − ρ
−1
t W . Then,
Yt+1 = Xt+1 − ρ
−1
t+1W
= stXt +P
′
tut − ρ
−1
t+1W
= st(Xt − ρ
−1
t W ) +P
′
tut
= stYt +P
′
tut,
and γt(Xt) can be re-written into
γt(Xt) = γˆt(Yt) =
{
γ+t Yt, if Yt ≥ 0,
−γ−t Yt, if Yt < 0.
Also, we have Vart(XT ) = Vart(YT ) according to the variance property.
Hence, problem (MVt(γt(Xt))) in (2) can be equivalently reduced into the
following problem
min Vart(YT )− γˆt(Yt)Et[YT ]− γˆt(Yt)W,
s.t. Yj+1 = sjYj +P
′
juj , j = t, t+ 1, · · · , T − 1, (15)
where Vart(YT ) = Var(YT |Yt) and Et[YT ] = E[YT |Yt].
At time t (t = 0, 1, · · · , T ), the investor faces the following optimization
problem,
min
ut
Jt(Yt;ut) =
(
Et[Y
2
T ]− (Et[YT ])
2
)
− γˆt(Yt)Et[YT ]− γˆt(Yt)W, (16)
where the conditional expectations Et[YT ] = E[YT |Yt] and Et[Y
2
T ] = E[Y
2
T |Yt]
are computed along the policy {ut,u
TC
t+1, · · · ,u
TC
T−1}.
We now prove by induction that the following two expressions,
Et[YT ] =ρtYt + a
+
t Yt1{Yt≥0} + a
−
t Yt1{Yt<0}, (17)
Et[Y
2
T ] =ρ
2
tY
2
t + (2ρta
+
t + b
+
t )Y
2
t 1{Yt≥0} + (2ρta
−
t + b
−
t )Y
2
t 1{Yt<0}, (18)
hold along the time consistent policy, {uTCt ,u
TC
t+1, · · · ,u
TC
T−1}, at time t.
At time T , we have
ET [YT ] = YT , ET [Y
2
T ] = Y
2
T ,
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with a+t = a
−
T = 0 and b
+
t = b
−
T = 0. Assume that expressions of the
first moment and the second moment in (17) and (18), respectively, hold at
time t+ 1 along the time consistent policy {uTCt+1, · · · ,u
TC
T−1}. We will prove
that these two expressions still hold at time t and the corresponding time
consistent policy is given by (9).
As the dynamic of period t is
Yt+1 = stYt +P
′
tut.
It follows from the policy {ut,u
TC
t+1, · · · ,u
TC
T−1} that we have
Et[YT ] = Et
[
Et+1[YT ]
]
= Et
[
ρt+1Yt+1 + a
+
t+1Yt+11{Yt+1≥0} + a
−
t+1Yt+11{Yt+1<0}
]
= Et[ρt+1(stYt +P
′
tut)] + Et
[
a+t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)1{stYt+P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)1{stYt+P′tut<0}
]
(19)
and
Et[Y
2
T ] = Et
[
Et+1[Y
2
T ]
]
= Et
[
ρ2t+1Y
2
t+1 + (2ρt+1a
+
t+1 + b
+
t+1)Y
2
t+11{Yt+1≥0}
+ (2ρt+1a
−
t+1 + b
−
t+1)Y
2
t+11{Yt+1<0}
]
= Et[ρ
2
t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)
2]
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
+
t+1 + b
+
t+1)(stYt +P
′
tut)
21{stYt+P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
−
t+1 + b
−
t+1)(stYt +P
′
tut)
21{stYt+P′tut<0}
]
. (20)
For Yt > 0, we denote any admissible policy as ut = KYt with K ∈ R
n. Then
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the cost functional can be expressed as
Jt(Yt;ut) =
(
Et[Y
2
T ]− (Et[YT ])
2
)
− γ+t YtEt[YT ]− γ
+
t YtW
= Et[ρ
2
t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)
2]−
(
Et[ρt+1(stYt +P
′
tut)]
)2
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
+
t+1 + b
+
t+1)(stYt +P
′
tut)
21{stYt+P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
−
t+1 + b
−
t+1)(stYt +P
′
tut)
21{stYt+P′tut<0}
]
−
(
Et
[
a+t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)1{stYt+P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)1{stYt+P′tut<0}
])2
− 2ρt+1
(
Et
[
a+t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)1{stYt+P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)1{stYt+P′tut<0}
])
Et[stYt +P
′
tut]
− γ+t Yt
(
Et
[
a+t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)1{stYt+P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(stYt +P
′
tut)1{stYt+P′tut<0}
])
− ρt+1γ
+
t YtEt[stYt +P
′
tut]− γ
+
t YtW
= Y 2t
{
ρ2t+1K
′(Et[PtP
′
t]− Et[P
′
t]Et[Pt])K
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
+
t+1 + b
+
t+1)(st +P
′
tK)
21{st+P′tK≥0}
]
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
−
t+1 + b
−
t+1)(st +P
′
tK)
21{st+P′tK<0}
]
−
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK<0}
])2
− 2ρt+1Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≥0}
]
(st + Et[P
′
t]K)
− 2ρt+1Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK<0}
]
(st + Et[P
′
t]K)
− γ+t
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK<0}
])
− ρt+1γ
+
t (st + Et[P
′
t]K)
}
− γ+t YtW
= Y 2t F
+
t (K)− γ
+
t YtW.
Applying Proposition 3.1 yields the optimal time consistent policy at time t,
uTCt = argmin
ut∈Rn
Jt(Yt;ut) = K
+
t Yt.
Then, substituting the above optimal time consistent policy back into (19)
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and (20) gives rise to
Et[YT ] = ρtYt + Yt
(
ρt+1Et[Pt]K
+
t + Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )1{st+P′tK
+
t ≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )1{st+P′tK+t <0}
] )
= ρtYt + a
+
t Yt
and
Et[Y
2
T ] = ρ
2
tY
2
t + 2ρtY
2
t
(
ρt+1Et[Pt]K
+
t + Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )1{st+P′tK
+
t ≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )1{st+P′tK+t <0}
] )
+
(
ρ2t+1(K
+
t )
′
Et[PtP
′
t]K
+
t + 2ρt+1Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )P
′
tK
+
t 1{st+P′tK
+
t ≥0}
]
+ 2ρt+1Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )P
′
tK
+
t 1{st+P′tK+t <0}
]
+ Et
[
b+t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )
21{st+P′tK
+
t ≥0}
]
+ Et
[
b−t+1(st +P
′
tK
+
t )
21{st+P′tK
+
t <0}
] )
Y 2t
= ρ2tY
2
t + (2ρta
+
t + b
+
t )Y
2
t .
Furthermore,
Vart(YT ) = Et[Y
2
T ]− (Et[YT ])
2 = (b+t − (a
+
t )
2)Y 2t ≥ 0,
implies b+t − (a
+
t )
2 ≥ 0.
For Yt < 0, we denote any admissible policy as ut = KYt with K ∈ R
n.
Then the cost functional can be expressed as
Jt(Yt;ut) =Y
2
t
{
ρ2t+1K
′(Et[PtP
′
t]− Et[P
′
t]Et[Pt])K
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
+
t+1 + b
+
t+1)(st +P
′
tK)
21{st+P′tK≤0}
]
+ Et
[
(2ρt+1a
−
t+1 + b
−
t+1)(st +P
′
tK)
21{st+P′tK>0}
]
−
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≤0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK>0}
])2
− 2ρt+1Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≤0}
]
(st + Et[P
′
t]K)
− 2ρt+1Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK>0}
]
(st + Et[P
′
t]K)
+ γ−t
(
Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK≤0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK)1{st+P′tK>0}
])
+ ρt+1γ
−
t (st + Et[P
′
t]K)
}
+ γ−t YtW
=Y 2t F
−
t (K) + γ
−
t YtW.
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Applying Proposition 3.1 yields the optimal time consistent policy at time t,
uTCt = argmin
ut∈Rn
Jt(Yt;ut) = K
−
t Yt.
Then, substituting the above optimal time consistent policy back into (19)
and (20) gives rise to
Et[YT ] = ρtYt + Yt
(
ρt+1Et[Pt]K
−
t + Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )1{st+P′tK
−
t ≤0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )1{st+P′tK−t >0}
] )
= ρtYt + a
−
t Yt
and
Et[Y
2
T ] = ρ
2
tY
2
t + 2ρtY
2
t
(
ρt+1Et[Pt]K
−
t + Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )1{st+P′tK−t ≤0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )1{st+P′tK
−
t >0}
] )
+
(
ρ2t+1(K
−
t )
′
Et[PtP
′
t]K
−
t + 2ρt+1Et
[
a+t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )P
′
tK
−
t 1{st+P′tK−t ≤0}
]
+ 2ρt+1Et
[
a−t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )P
′
tK
−
t 1{st+P′tK
−
t >0}
]
+ Et
[
b+t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )
21{st+P′tK
−
t ≤0}
]
+ Et
[
b−t+1(st +P
′
tK
−
t )
21{st+P′tK
−
t >0}
] )
Y 2t
= ρ2tY
2
t + (2ρta
−
t + b
−
t )Y
2
t .
Furthermore,
Vart(YT ) = Et[Y
2
T ]− (Et[YT ])
2 = (b−t − (a
−
t )
2)Y 2t ≥ 0,
implies b−t − (a
−
t )
2 ≥ 0.
For Yt = 0, the cost functional reduces to the conditional variance of the
terminal wealth along policy {ut,u
TC
t+1, · · · ,u
TC
T−1}, which can be expressed as
Jt(Yt;ut) = ρ
2
t+1u
′
t(Et[PtP
′
t]− Et[P
′
t]Et[Pt])ut
+ Et
[
b+t+1(P
′
tut)
21{P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
b−t+1(P
′
tut)
21{P′tut<0}
]
−
(
Et
[
a+t+1P
′
tut1{P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1P
′
tut1{P′tut<0}
] )2
+ 2ρt+1
(
Et
[
a+t+1(P
′
tut)
21{P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1(P
′
tut)
21{P′tut<0}
])
− 2ρt+1
(
Et
[
a+t+1P
′
tut1{P′tut≥0}
]
+ Et
[
a−t+1P
′
tut1{P′tut<0}
] )
Et[P
′
t]ut
≥ 0.
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It is not difficult to conclude that uTCt = argmax
ut∈Rn
Jt(Yt;ut) = 0.
Therefore, along the time consistent policy {uTCt ,u
TC
t+1, · · · ,u
TC
T−1}, ex-
pressions (17) and (18) hold at time t, which completes our proof. 
Appendix C: The Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Following the technique in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can derive
the main results directly with the following specifics.
i) ForXt > ρ
−1
t W , we denote any admissible policy as ut = K(Xt−ρ
−1
t W )
with K ∈ At.
ii) For Xt < ρ
−1
t W , we denote any admissible policy as ut = K(Xt −
ρ−1t W ) with K ∈ −At, where −At is the negative cone of At.
iii) For Xt = ρ
−1
t W , we can similarly prove u
TC
t = 0.
Therefore, we have
K˜+t = argmin
K∈At
F+t (K), K˜
−
t = argmin
K∈−At
F−t (K).
This completes the proof. 
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